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The This pathbreaking paper links the literature of effective. But there is no efficient market, nor a institutional economics with the lessons of develstrong civil society, in the absence of good governopment experience.
ment. Projects can thus be viewed as inputs into balanced institutional development strategies. It starts by describing the changing role of development projects, which began as instruments of The paper concludes by suggesting that we are in public or investment finance but have become a the midst of a social transformation which is likely key vehicle for institutional and policy reform. It to further modify our views of development needs then proposes a systematic approach to the design and objectives. In a rapidly changing global of institutional arrangements.
economy in which national boundaries are collapsing, global markets are expanding, and the free Specifically, the paper explores the complementary flow of ideas is giving rise to an "associational roles of the state, market, and voluntary sectors in revolution," new institutions and new approaches providing development goods and services. It to development will be required and multilateral describes their strengths and limitations and solutions will be needed to solve collective action explains their mutually reinforcing roles. Next, it dilemmas at the global level. classifies development projects according to the nature of the goods they are intended to provide
In linking these ideas and showing their power to and draws implications for the appropriate fill gaps in the development paradigm, the paper organizational mix between the government, the invites expanded use of institutional economics in voluntary sector, and the market. And it uses the dealing with development problems. same typology to probe the art of improved governance.
Ismail Serageldin The implications for development practice are
Vice President clear. Markets should be used where feasible and Environmentally Sustainable Development Abstract This paper explores the intersection between change. It proposes a systematic framework institutional economics and development pracfor institutional design and deals with the pattern tice. Intent on shaping development policy and of different kinds of institutional goods in a overcoming implementation dilemmas, developcountry context. Last, the paper analyzes the ment decision makers need new and useful ideas global factors underlying the growing demand about institutions at project, country, and global for institutional reform and describes why such levels. The paper presents development projects reform is achieved more readily through multilatas instruments of policy reform and institutional eral cooperation.
Introduction
The new agenda for sustainable development calls tion of practitioners. Therefore, institutional for a mix of market-friendly, people-friendly, and economics has been put to work to enhance the environment-friendly policies. It is equidistant impact of development programs and projects. In from the failed interventionist doctrines of the left this context, Chapter 2 describes the privileged and the "state minimalist" precepts of the right role of projects in development assistance. Chap- (Streeten 1993) . Given complex and highly differter 3 proposes a systematic approach to their entiated development problems, policy makers organizational design. Chapter 4 deals with the need relevant support from the academy in their governance dimension of development assistance. search for pragmatic, tailor-made solutions.
Finally, Chapter 5 attempts a global synthesis.
In particular, the design of responsive and accountable institutions has become a central preoccupa-
The Institutional Economics of Development Projects
The Project as an Institution appeared well adapted to public sector activity until issues of economic policy and governance Development is a long-term, incremental process.
emerged as central to the realization of sustain-A key instrument of development is the investable project benefits. ment project.' Projects aim at finite, specific, monitorable objectives. They incorporate reAs development experience accumulated, it sources commensurate to the task and aim to became evident that policies and institutions overcome market failures. They are the building matter more than public investment. In turn, the blocks of development programs and their requirements of a new development agenda selection for external assistance implies that they emphasizing social, environmental, and instituhave priority for concentrated attention.
tional concerns led to gradual changes in the very conception of what constitutes a project. IncreasThus, according to Albert 0. Hirschman (1967) , ingly, projects came to be viewed as policy projects are "privileged particles of developexperiments and as instruments of institutional ment." They are meant to address problems that reform. are especially relevant to the achievement of priority development objectives. They are Precisely because the project proved a flexible expected to produce benefits well in excess of tool, adaptable to changing priorities, it has their costs, including the opportunity cost of the survived as an effective and influential developcapital invested in them.
2 Often, they bring in ment instrument. new technologies and skills or help to capitalize on forward and backward linkages. Their indirect Project Modalities and external benefits are as important as their direct benefits. Conversely, they frequently
The institutional architecture of projects reflects involve unintended social and environmental the principles of economic organization elabocosts.
rated by business economists (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . Fundamentally, a project is a set of The project achieved initial prominence as a contracts linking principals and agents, that is, development instrument because it reflected the owners, employees, contractors, consultants, and experience of wartime planning. The presumpbeneficiaries. tion of a direct and unambiguous relationship between public expenditure inputs and developAn overarching contract also links the country ment results made it easy to "retail" development and the external development agency in the form programs for external support and was consistent of a negotiated project agreement which incorpowith the blueprint approach to development then rates rewards and penalties. Standard clauses in vogue. Thus, development projects were define rules of the game for the procurement of originally conceived as "one shot" efforts geared goods, the disbursement of funds, the auditing of to physical investment carried out over a limited accounts, the evaluation of impact, and so on. period of time. Such a straightforward approach Tailor-made clauses raise the costs of noncompli-2 ance with respect to project-specific performance project savings, the provision of implementation objectives.
support, or the financing of "repeater" projects.
Incentives for effective performance are embedded Project Dilemmas in project agreements. Reporting requirements provide for monitoring of contract compliance.
Moral hazard is a central preoccupation of developDisbursements may be suspended or project loans ment lenders. For reasons of efficiency and recicanceled if misprocurement takes place or if procity, a cooperative mode in the handling of fundamental provisions embedded in the agreeunexpected problems is the norm. Yet, opportunisments have been violated. Conversely, effective tic behavior must be discouraged. While relatively project performance produces positive spillover minor infractions are not penalized, egregious free effects, for example, with respect to the use of riding is inhibited by incentives and penalties. The familiar tradeoffs explored by business econo-remarkable enrichment of a development agenda mists-with respect to the depth of monitoring which now encompasses social and environmental versus the capacity constraints affecting informaconcerns and aims at greater participation. Projects tion processing, the degree of contractual complete-increasingly incorporate policy and institutionness versus the resort to performance incentives, building features. This is producing more ambiand the demandingness of performance standards tious operations, involving higher benefits but also versus the risks of adverse selection-are routinely higher transaction costs and risks (World Bank faced in development assistance operations. 1995). See Figure 2 .2.
These considerations translate into transaction In response, improved internal management costs. Some are borne by the borrower-others by programs have been introduced to manage portfothe development agency. The benefits of developlio risks, to enhance the development impact of ment learning arising out of individual projects are projects, and to streamline business processes shared throughout the membership. At their best, (World Bank 1993b). The very cycle through which projects act as pathfinders for the overall developprojects are conceived and implemented is being ment enterprise.
reconsidered (Picciotto and Weaving 1994 ).
An Evolving Development Instrument
Such reforms are consistent with the precepts of institutional economics. The problem of imperfect Projects tend to reflect the development concepcommitment to project objectives having been tions of their time. As long as planning dominated identified as a major cause of unsatisfactory development practice, projects were perceived as development outcomes, more effective routines of slices of the public investment program. Their project preparation and approval directed at design was geared to the achievement of physical building borrower "ownership" emerged Johnson goals and government expenditure targets. Optiand Wasty 1993) . Information asymmetries having mization was sought through systems analysis.
been found to affect the development impact of Project preparation focused on issues of size, projects, more rigorous inspection and evaluation physical characteristics, and technical parameters.
arrangements have been put in place (World Bank Economic analysis concentrated on shadow pricing 1993b). The streamlining of internal information to compensate for market distortions. In short, flows, shifts of administrative resources toward projects reflected the then prevalent "production client relations, strengthening of management function" metaphor of development.
accountability for results, and tighter budget policies have come to dominate development Once the neoclassical resurgence set in, projects no agency reforms. All of these measures aim to longer took economic distortions for granted and, enhance the incentives for successful development instead, began to address the policies that created performance and lower transaction costs. them. New lending instruments were forged to provide quick-disbursing assistance explicitly targeted at policy adjustment. economists. In particular, the literature has brought management is a recurring feature of macroto light the difficulties of aligning individual economic adjustment, the judicious assignment of incentives to the common good in large and heteroresponsibilities to the public, private, and volungeneous groups (vs. Mancur Olson's pioneering tary sectors is critical to the design of institutional work on the dilemmas of collective action). arrangements at the project level. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the nature of project By now, the powerful incentives to "free ride" that goods is fundamental to organizational design.
are inherent to large groups are well understood. Similarly, the transaction cost literature has illumiTraditionally, the institutional design of projects nated the contractual enforcement difficulties was dominated by an a priori public sector orientaassociated with excessive reliance on hierarchy and tion. As government capacity and fiscal concontrol. Whereas, under the traditional public straints came to light, there was greater emphasis investment planning approach, there was a preon mobilizing private resources for development. sumption in favor of command and control organiAt the same time, in response to pressing social zations, institutional theory has established that the and environmental problems, voluntary organizadesirable point of departure for reviewing project tions multiplied and attracted substantial developdesign options is the market. ment funding. The same societal shifts made the involvement of beneficiaries in achieving project Specifically, where markets can be used efficiently objectives (participation) an article of faith for the they should be, since-compared with the alternaentire development community (Organization for tives -they save on scarce administrative capaciEconomic Cooperation and Development 1991).
ties, avoid the public choice obstacles associated with large organizations, and tend to be responsive Thus, as disillusionment with the capacity of to consumer needs. This said, not all development states to control the "commanding heights" of problems are amenable to market solutions. developing economies set in, the role of the private and voluntary sectors increased and the assumpIn particular, private transactions are effective only tions governing the design of project organizations for goods which are consumed by one person at a had to be reconsidered. Missing so far has been a time (subtractability) and in circumstances where 6 individual consumers can be excluded without traditional arrangements for resource preservaincurring substantial costs (excludability). It is the tion and equitable distribution of benefits withcombination of these characteristics, which, along out putting in place effective management with competition, provides the conditions of free alternatives.
entry and exit which results in market efficiency. The implications for institutional design are Thus, allocation of water at the watercourse level, fundamental (Kessides 1993) . See Figure 3 .1.
access to community pastures and natural forests, or use of scarce fisheries resources can turn into Common Pool Projects tragedies of the commons (that is, unintended resource exhaustion) unless effective participatory The management of common pool goods (common institutions are in place and support whatever pastures, irrigation water, and so on) is especially technological innovations or management changes challenging because such goods lack excludability are introduced. In such situations, individual while enjoying subtractability. This hinders incentives left to themselves clash with the commarket operation. With subtractability high, mon good and regulatory institutions imposed competition for access to the good is heightened from the top down can be ineffective, especially in by its finite supply. In most instances, hierarchy is circumstances where they are readily undermined not an effective deterrent to free riding either, by corruption or collusion. because effective rationing requires an elaborate monitoring infrastructure which may not be
The privileged role of participation in the manageavailable or an administrative apparatus so vast ment of community projects is illustrated by the that it is easily subverted.
Matruh Natural Resource Management Project in Egypt supported by the World Bank and underThe failure of market mechanisms combined taken in collaboration with Bedouin communities; with the impracticability of controls explains in the National Irrigation Administration Program why common pool goods are best managed carried out in the Philippines to improve water through persuasion and cooperation. Uninhibited management, and in the Pakistan Oragi Pilot market incentives or technocratic management Project, which aims to develop affordable sewermodes unaccompanied by appropriate participaage for Karachi's squatter settlements.' In all these tory arrangements are frequent causes of project instances, community involvement and local failures for common pool projects. In particular, contributions are combined with technical improjects that depend on the management of finite provements and reduction of corrupt practices natural resources tend to fail when they disrupt through peer group pressures. Thus, cooperative scenarios with happy endings postponing) behavior was a key factor of organido exist (that is, natural resources can be managed) zational resilience in many situations. Hence, the if institutional design takes due account of the role of loyalty-inducing hierarchy. See Figure 3 .3. prerequisites-selective incentives, relatively small groups, strong leadership-identified by Mancur Organizational design can now be defined as the Olson with respect to the solution of collective selection of appropriate exit, voice, and loyalty action dilemmas.
building mechanisms. When the market represents the most appropriate mode of project Exit and Voice operation, exit mechanisms should be given pride of place. When participation is the answer, it Where consumption by one beneficiary does not makes sense to nurture voice mechanisms. Loyreduce availability of the good to others (that is, alty (and its ally, hierarchy) intervenes when exit when subtractability is rnissing), powerful incenand voice cohabit, but exit needs restraint to give tives to free ride exist as well. In such circumfull scope to the recuperative benefits of voice. stances, hierarchy can help. But experience, as Thus, for pure public goods (for example, a more well as theory, suggests that market mechanisms rigorous tax policy or a traffic signalling scheme) (exit) are also needed where control of access is full benefits occur where loyalty is encouraged by feasible (toll goods), whereas voice mechanisms are effective policing (hierarchy) and / or users are called for where it is not (pure public goods). See involved and motivated (participation). Public Goods Projects It was a World Bank-financed railways project in Nigeria which pointed Albert 0. Hirschman to the World Bank experience with rural roads and discovery of what is arguably the most influential water supply projects confirms the importance of trilogy of institutional economics: exit, voice, and loyalty-building mechanisms and the need for a loyalty (Hirschman 1970) . Because of the ease mix of hierarchy and participation for public with which the railways corporation could tap into goods projects. In the Gurage roads organization the national treasury, Hirschman noted that exit of in Ethiopia, local maintenance has been handled important customers weakened the very voice effectively since 1962 through community involveoption that might have triggered recuperative ment, training, and adequate compensation of mechanisms within the public agency. Thus, service operators. Under a pilot program in Cote Hirschman concluded that loyalist (that is, exit d'lvoire, villages were explicitly required to maintain handpumps at their own expense and Toll Goods Projects were provided with training. The program resulted in more reliable water service.
Toll goods projects (such as for piped water) can only be managed effectively through organizaIn the C6te d'Ivoire case, collective action dilemtional options which combine market and hierarmas arose, when attempting to organize competing chy. The choice of options (ranging from regulated interests into water management committees. The private water companies, concessions, autonomous problem was especially serious in the larger public corporations, to contracting) depends on a villages and, in a revealing manifestation of variety of project characteristics (whether or not hierarchy, the village chief simply took over the costs are sunk; network features); the administraselection of committee members. Similarly, in the tive resources available, the feasibility of regulation Zambia Social Recovery Fund Project, boreholes and initial conditions, and so on. The sequencing were dug to relieve severe water shortages without of reform requires judicious assessments of institulocal contribution and, given the perceived urtional potentials and constraints. gency of the scheme, with minimal consultations. When pumps failed, the beneficiaries refused to
The regulation of utilities illustrates how systemcontribute to the needed repairs.
atic institutional design can encourage private investment while maintaining competition and Thus, the authoritative role of hierarchy is vital efficient pricing. Institutional economics has helped when a small part of the beneficiary population to shape well-adapted arrangements that ensure involved in a project exercises undue influence. In compatibility with domestic legislative, executive the Central Visayas Regional Development Project and judicial institutions (Levy and Spiller 1993) . (Philippines), community organizations were allowed to organize forest residents in reaping Credible commitment that regulatory discretion traditional benefits out of protected forest areas.
will be restrained within fair bounds, that basic This arrangement had to be revoked when the changes in the enabling environment will not take leaders of these organizations colluded with timber place, and that effective and independent recourse merchants to harvest live trees. This familiar will be available in case of conflict are basic deterexample of the corroding impact of vested interests minants of private utility investment and operaillustrates the need to align individual incentives tion. This is why policy options regarding with the common good lest the public venture regulatory reform must take account of the initial becomes a hostage of minority vested interests as conditions characteristic of the country's institupredicted by public choice theory (Gerson 1993) . tional environment. In the design of appropriate institutional solutions executive and the legislative branches of governfor toll goods projects, the existence of a respected ment, that is, a mix of hierarchy and participation. and independent judiciary has been shown to be Government goods are important because without fundamental. In its absence, reliable external enforcement and the deterrence it produces, conflict-resolution mechanisms have to be speciopportunism prevails. Therefore, the market fied. Safeguards can be provided through legislaneeds the state just as the state needs the market. tion (as in Chile) or embedded in the operating But this cohabitation is not trouble free, since license (as in Jamaica). Where existing institutions overzealous reliance on one automatically underare incapable of effective and flexible enforcement mines the other, for example through bureaucratic of broad regulations, complex rules are needed, constraints associated with the state or the rentwhich presumes, of course, that strong adminisseeking behavior associated with private parties. trative capacity is available.
Yet another category of goods-civil goods-is In certain situations, as a transitional measure, needed for effective market operation. It differs international mechanisms may be able to provide fundamentally from the others. Delivered by comfort to participants to offset domestic adminisprivate voluntary organizations of bewildering trative weaknesses. For example, World Bank diversity, civil goods have grown rapidly precisely guarantees against noncommercial risk have been in countries where the market and the state are used to encourage investment while core institupoised in relative balance. In totalitarian regimes, tions are strengthened and a constituency the civil society is weak precisely because hierarfor domestic capacity building and reform is chy brooks no dissent. In countries where the state nurtured.
is failing and markets are moribund, voluntary action also tends to be weak. Thus, civil society Government and Civil Goods Projects plays a vital supporting role by filling gaps in private and government activities, by exhorting, Where both subtractability and excludability motivating, and restraining the state, and by obtain-as they do for most agricultural and calling attention to the excesses of free and unreindustrial products-efficient resource allocation strained markets. and consumer satisfaction prevail, provided the market is allowed to operate freely and efficiently Civil organizations are breeding grounds for and market participants are intent on maximizing participation and cooperation. They operate with their incomes (as producers) or their satisfaction minimal reference to hierarchy. Indeed, they often (as consumers). This implies, of course, that a define themselves in opposition to the state-as suitable policy framework is in place.
the "nongovernmental" sector. They thrive on debate and make shrewd use of advocacy to The dilemma is that policy itself is a public good: achieve their objectives. Their ascent parallels the market involvement by an individual producer or decline of the state, the rise of the market, and the consumer does not detract from the involvement growing dissatisfaction with the failings of both of other participants and there is no obstacle to the state and the market. access. In other words, the market cannot operate effectively without the likelihood of contractual To be sure, there is no guarantee that all compoenforcement, that is, without the production of nents of civil society are benign or genuinely certain government goods. Thus, a distinction is concerned with the fate of the downtrodden. made between policy formulation, which involves Indeed, theory suggests that the smaller and more a mix of hierarchy and participation, and policy motivated the group, the more vocal and effective implementation, which relies largely on hierarchy.
it is in maintaining cohesion and achieving results. This means that the extremes often rule. Thus, The administration of commercial law, the mansome private voluntary organizations are specifiagement of safety nets, or the implementation of cally created to advance the interests of narrow environmental regulations are examples of and privileged constituencies. Therefore, failing government goods. Such goods are the fruits of effective self-policing, the civil society must be the executive and judiciary branches. They differ restrained to work for the common good both by from the regulations and laws themselves, the the workings of the market and by the enabling production of which typically involves both the environment of the state. Figure 3 .4, drawing on Keidel's (1995) approach to And an appropriate balance is struck when "seeing organizational patterns,"shows the full excessive power by any one sector is counteracted array of project categories described above and by one or the other two. Thus, if one sector is their relationship to the three major development patently weak, judiciously selected capacityinstitutions: the state, the market, and the volunbuilding projects can help redress the balance (see tary sector. Obviously, the dividing lines between Chapter 4). Thus, effective governance involves the six categories of goods are not sharp and there cross-cutting and shiffing alliances as well as is considerable synergy among them. For example, deliberate capacity-building efforts aimed at the state requires a mix of government goods (for mutually supportive operation of the state, the enforcement) and of public goods (for representamarket, and the civil society. tion of various interests) so as to yield legitimacy. Yet, the framework can be used with profit to
The actual mix is highly dependent on initial initiate organizational design at the micro (project) conditions: path dependence is an important level. And it can also facilitate institutional design feature of institutions. External advice may be at the macro (country) level as Chapter 4 shows.
needed to design arrangements combining wellengineered exit, voice, and loyalty mechanisms.
A Delicate Balance
Moving from one institutional equilibrium to the next without losing ground can be an acrobatic In sum, development requires government and maneuver the success of which may be facilitated civil goods in addition to a judicious mix of by an outside party. private, public, common pool, and toll goods. Institutional economics helps explain why projects are now seen as mechanisms through which such Note goods are supplied. This role is fundamental because the art of governance consists of achieving 1. A Bankwide Learning Group on Participatory an appropriate balance between the products of Development was launched in December 1990. In various institutional goods so as to achieve a August 1994, it produced recommendations to increase positive interplay between the state, the market, participation in Bank work. The recommendations and the voluntary sector. There is a natural tension were endorsed by the Bank's management and its between each of these actors given their contrastBoard. Many of the illustrations provided in the paper ing mandates and their different constituencies.
are drawn from the work of the Learning Group.
The Governance Dimension of Development Assistance
Chapter 2 described projects as public goods introduction of effective economic policy, good designed to overcome failures in development economic management facilitates the reform of markets. Chapter 3 proposed an analytical framegovernance arrangements. work for the design of project institutions within a macroinstitutional structure which was taken as Reorienting Government given. In this chapter, the institutional resource endowment of the country is the focus: institutional This explains why in addition to providing capital is viewed as a primary determinant of developing member countries with funding and economic and social performance. From this policy advice, development assistance is now perspective, depending on their relevance to the addressing governance issues in their own right country's institutional development needs, projects (World Bank 1992) . With the introduction of deplete available institutional capital or contribute policy-based lending, the focus has shifted to its accumulation.
towards the enhancement of countrywide institutions. One important way of improving goverTaking Account of Initial Conditions nance has been to help ensure that scarce public resources are concentrated on functions that only Poor development management is the inevitable the government can provide while encouraging a consequence of corrupt, misdirected, or weak greater role for the private sector and civil society. government because only government can create an enabling environment for the development of Therefore, taking account of country conditions efficient markets and, together with civil organizaand objectives, the principles illustrated in Figure  tions , can sponsor programs to protect the poor 3.4 for the micro level apply equally at the macro and the environment.
level. For example, public capacity-building activities are best geared to the discharge of Institutional endowment varies across countries.
functions for which the state is well suited, while In some, traditions, rules, and organizations policy advice is best directed to establishing render development efforts effective. In others, positive enabling environments for private characterized by poor governance, economic enterprise and voluntary activities to fill whatever performance is hindered by a tendency to divert gaps are left. See Figure 4 .1, which illustrates a puL.-. -sources for private gain; arbitrary, sequential approach to policy reform, focusing unpredicta2'-government behavior; excessive first on reorienting the role of the state and next rules and regulations; or unresponsive, opaque on encouraging the voluntary sector to assist in decision making. the adjustment process.
Poor development performance (typically induced Financial Sector Development by external shocks and misguided policies) also contributes to poor governance. Stagnant econoChanges in financial systems illustrate how the mies induce weak public finances, dissatisfaction redefinition of the role of the state has induced among citizens, and pervasive distrust of governpervasive changes in the institutional fabric of ment. Just as good governance facilitates the developing countries (World Bank 1993a).
FIGuRE 4.1: GOVERNANCE REFORM

State
Market Voluntary
In the 1950s and 1960s, almost all developing parallel with reform in the regulatory framework country governments took control of private and stabilization of the economy. financial systems and set up specialized banks for agriculture and industry under public ownership More recently, the emergence of substantial private and control. The state directed financial instituflows has put the emphasis on securities-based tions to lend to selected industries on subsidized systems and the development of capital markets. terms. The limitations of this approach were not Partly as a result of policy reform, private capital apparent as long as there was easy access to foreign flows to developing countries have risen. They funding.
represent portfolio investment (through bonds and equities) as well as foreign direct investment After the onset of the debt crisis, high interest rates, fuelled by privatization. They are concentrated in low commodity prices, and devaluations increased countries that have achieved effective economic the domestic burden of borrowing firms' foreign stabilization, policy reform, and institutional debts and governments had to borrow domestically development in their financial sectors and capital for their needs, exacerbating inflationary pressures. markets. Just as governments set the rules for Given the artificially low lending rates in force, as markets, markets are now setting constraints on the well as the poor quality of the loans made, the role of governments. banking system became unviable in many countries and financial sector reform became a top priority.
Public Sector Management
In some countries, reforms of the company, bankIn sum, given the fundamental dilemmas of ing, securities, and bankruptcy laws were required. collective action highlighted by theory, the concenIn others, fiscal policy, banking supervision, and tration of public sector activities on appropriate regulation had to be redirected away from credit functions has emerged as a necessary condition of allocation and interest rate controls toward the effective governance. Hence, the focus of the new maintenance of a healthy and efficient financial development agenda on civil service reform; system. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet increased competitiveness of the business environUnion, wholesale restructuring had to take place in ment; improved effectiveness and efficiency of public agencies; restructuring, liquidation, and economic performance. Financial accountability at privatization of public enterprises; and decentralithe project level faces obstacles linked to generic zation of government administration. Experience weaknesses in countrywide public accounting, shows that the success of such programs depends expenditure control, and cash management. To not only on the effective transfer of skills and address this issue, technical assistance can be practices but also on the broadly based "ownerdevoted to build up domestic institutional capacity. ship" of reform objectives and the construction of workable coalitions Uohnson and Wasty 1993) .
Similarly, accountability for economic performance may be addressed through budget policy reforms; Focus on government commitment to reform is improved public expenditure management, rerelatively new. Public choice theory has shaped moval of white elephants from investment propractice by highlighting the gap that often exists grams; decentralization of public administration; between public policy pronouncements and actual elimination of ghost workers from public employimplementation and by identifying strategies aimed ment rolls; closure and privatization of public at aligning individual incentives and social goals.
enterprises; making public entities commercial as well as evaluation capacity building. Accountability Thus, the World Bank has provided assistance to Accountability requires mediation among three Poland and Romania for decentralization, to distinct groups: (1) recipients of public services; (2) Indonesia for financial accountancy development, political leaders who oversee service providers; (3) to China for evaluation capacity building, and to the service providers themselves. The goals and Ghana and Madagascar for public financial maninterests of each group differ from those of the agement. In order to improve accountability for other two, and a useful role for development environmental programs, the Bank has required the assistance agencies is to help prevent capture of the preparation of environmental impact assessments public good by one of the groups to the detriment for the projects it finances and has assisted its of the others-and of the public interest. Where member countries in the design of countrywide such capture is prevented, loyalty is enhanced. environmental action plans. Research into appropriate indicators for environmentally sound manIt is not practical to expect sustainable reform agement of natural resources is underway. toward accountability through actions limited to the micro (project) level since the role of the modThe Rule of Law ern state involves a myriad of interrelated functions, and projects have a limited focus and a finite Still another dimension of governance capacity life. Macro-level accountability, on the other hand, building is the establishment of a sound and calls for sustained shifts in public attitudes and predictable legal framework for development. Five government practices, and "path dependence" is a elements are involved: (1) rules known in advance; powerful drag on wholesale reform. Given these (2) enforcement of rules; (3) monitoring; (4) conflict obstacles, a judicious mix of "micro" and "macro" resolution; and (5) timely amendment of rules. interventions is needed and mobilization of scatTogether, they facilitate the production of what was tered energies in support of reform is often feasible earlier defined as "government goods" essential to only in periods of crisis. This explains the links the reduction of transaction costs. between financial crises, governance reform, and policy adjustment. Beyond the management of To this end, the World Bank has assisted Mauritania public finances and the design of investment and Guinea in disseminating information about the projects, policy dialogue, public education, nurturlaw through official gazettes. In Laos, the Bank has ing of consensus, and carefully sequenced stratehelped to fund legal training and the promulgation gies of reform have become central to the of business legislation. In Romania and the Czech development enterprise. Ideas matter.
Republic, contradictions and inconsistencies in legislation have been identified and removed. In Sri Among the government goods that are Lanka, financial sector adjustment lending has underproduced for public choice reasons are those helped to reform the laws allowing financial which enhance accountability for financial and institutions to foreclose on collateral.
Under the Philippines Financial Sector Adjustment lings during their five-year maturation period since Loan, the bankruptcy law has been revised to make the returns were too distant to motivate collective it less punitive to debtors and more rehabilitative action. Accordingly, undergrowth plants were in the interest of both debtors and creditors. In added to the plantations to be harvested on a Bangladesh, a financial sector adjustment credit has rotating basis. helped to establish courts, appoint judges, and dispose of cases to implement a law designed to
The emergence of a strong voluntary sector dereduce the time needed to settle suits brought by pends on a host of cultural and historical factors. financial institutions against defaulting borrowers.
In some countries (Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, India, Kenya, Mexico, Zimbabwe) voluntary Transparency and Participation agencies have mushroomed. In others, they have not and remain very dependent on official sponsorVoice mechanisms are the lifeblood of participatory ship and support. Pressures to coopt NGOs are modes of governance. Since these mechanisms ever-present and must be resisted. Yet, there is depend heavily on information dissemination, great scope for complementary action as NGOs, suitable rules of the game concerning disclosure despite frequent administrative weaknesses, can be and dissemination of public information are part cost-effective in reaching low-income groups. and parcel of improved governance. Considerable
Today NGOs act as effective partners of the state experimentation has taken place in building (and of development agencies) in a wide range of solidarity and incentives for participation at the development operations. project level and in strengthening voice mechanisms used by beneficiaries vis-a-vis public agenCountry Institutional Development Strategies cies. To take hold, these often require the provision of special incentives and the involvement of an Institution building is a time-consuming, complex outside party.
process. It requires a long-term vision, sustained efforts, and well-sequenced operations. The In a pilot project in Bangladesh, for example, where paradox of institutional development is that it is tradition normally excluded destitute women and the most needed in the very countries where it is widows from gainful employment, nongovernmenmost difficult to achieve. Where commitment from tal agencies organized landless contracting societthe political leadership is not available, it needs to ies to involve these women in construction activity be nurtured without major resource outlays. to preserve flood-prone embankments. In PakiWhere, on the other hand, ownership is assured, stan, during implementation of the Integrated Hill nimble and responsive external assistance can yield Farming Project, it became clear that communities very high returns. Judicious choice of instruments organized to undertake reforestation were not and partnership among development agencies are disposed to maintaining and protecting the sapcentral to cost-effectiveness and selectivity.
The Global Dimension of Institutional Development
It should be clear by now why, in the words of factors: (1) the growing interdependence of the Oliver E. Williamson (1994) , "institutional ecointernational economy and the physical environnomics has been invited to join the arena" of ment; (2) the explosive impact of demography and development economics. A pragmatic reaction technology; and (3) the tight fiscal constraints on against the orthodoxies of planning and neoclassi-governments and development agencies. cism, institutional economics aims to bridge, encompass, and transcend these orthodoxies so as
These factors are interrelated. The world to provide more reliable guides to development economy has become global not only as a result of decision making.
trade liberalization but also because of innovations in telecommunications and information In the neoclassical world, a "hidden hand"
technologies. These technologies have made manages resource allocation. In nonmarket governance failures more visible. The fiscal environments, a providential or dictatorial constraints that plague the public sector are "hiding hand" seeks to maximize social utility.
themselves the indirect result of unstable monBoth conceptions are unrealistic: they ignore etary and fiscal policies triggered by global shifts transaction costs and take little account of the in exchange rates, interest rates, and capital flows. incentives and interests which underlie policy.
Conversely, fresh opportunities have arisen as a By contrast, institutionalists are concerned with result of the new agility, responsiveness, and the costs and benefits of transactions and suspilocation-independence of multinational produccious of the "immaculate conception" school of tion (Lindbaek and Rischard 1994) . Improved economic decision making. They seek to undereconomic policies and new financial instruments stand the motivation of economic agents in order are unlocking the enormous potential of private to build effective strategies for reform. Thus, the capital markets to meet the pent-up needs for ascent of institutional economics is partly related infrastructure investment in developing countries. to supply factors-the production of realistic and relevant concepts by the new institutionalists. But At the same time, major ecological threats requirit also reflects demand factors, that is, the urgent ing collective action are looming. Global warmneed for new ideas to assist principled and ing, water scarcity, acid rain, deforestation, public practical decision making in the rapidly evolving health crises, and large-scale migrations transcend development business of an increasingly interdenational borders. The need for multilateral action pendent world.
is especially dominant with respect to failed and failing states. The centrifugal forces unleashed by Global Factors the end of the cold war are fueling regional conflicts, famines, and refugee movements Underlying this demand are vast changes in the precisely in areas where population growth is global economy. The urgent need to reform galloping, environmental stress is high, and economic institutions arises out of three main development has been lagging.
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It is no accident that where development has failed, In the developing world, 4,600 international basic governance and institutions have usually voluntary organizations are now active and been weak. Enhancement of domestic capacities support approximately 20,000 indigenous nonsimply cannot be handled within reasonable time governmental organizations. A growing share of frames without sustained international cooperation concessional development assistance is being and development assistance. In a sense, governchannelled through them. Similar developments ment goods and civil goods have become internaare evident in Eastern Europe and the former tionally traded services. Shifting boundaries for Soviet Union. The economic and political signifimarket solutions, the rise of the voluntary sector, cance of this trend (at a time when the institutions and rising returns to investment in ideas have of the state have been rolled back) are considerable confirmed the continuing need for responsive and especially relevant with respect to the global international development cooperation. environmental challenge.
Shifting Boundaries for Market Solutions Growing Returns to Investment in Ideas
Specifically, technological developments have Fiscal constraints have also played a role in shifting reduced the natural monopoly characteristics of institutional boundaries. According to Larry major infrastructure services. Containerization has Summers, "with money scarce, we need ideas." introduced competition in port services. The Rates of return on the generation of good policies wireless revolution is inducing small telecommuni-and their dissemination are enormous. As noted cations operators to compete with large wire-based earlier, policies are public goods. Their production networks. Independent power producers can and delivery calls for a combination of hierarchy construct and operate relatively small power plants and participation.
in competition with large public generation plants (Bond and Carter 1994) . Policy is useless without an institutional machinery capable of implementing it. The travails of the Innovative financing techniques offer institutional economies in transition, as well as those of Subinvestors and venture capitalists opportunities to Saharan Africa, illustrate this simple proposition. diversify their portfolios in emerging markets.
Self-help and internal determination are the keys to Learning from the experience of developed and success but external support has been shown to be reforming developing countries has also played a instrumental in overcoming public choice obstacles role in igniting institutional reform, not only with and laying the foundations for sustainable growth. respect to the encouragement of foreign direct New institutional capital created by the voluntary investment, privatization, and financial sector sector has also come into play in the search for reform but also in the social and environmental effective institutional-development strategies. areas.
Within the development community of both Rise of the Global Voluntary Sector theoreticians and practitioners, a remarkable global consensus about development strategies According to Lester M. Salamon (1994) , "We are in has emerged over the past decade, due in signifithe midst of a global associational revolution that cant part to the research and evaluation outputs may prove to be as significant to the latter twentiof multilateral institutions. In addition, a great eth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the deal of experimentation has taken place to find the latter nineteenth." right balance between markets, the state, and the voluntary sector in the design of development The growth of self-governing private organizations institutions. Demographic stress on environmental is tapping into the enormous benefits that small resources, advances in technology, and greater groups are known to enjoy. Voluntary agencies are insights about the role of markets and property able to mobilize grassroots energies through smallrights derived from recent advances in institutional scale, flexible interventions. At the same time, the economics have shifted the institutional equilibnew communications technologies and the rise of rium throughout the developing world. These global mass media have allowed them to network are the trends which underlie the growing reland influence public opinion on an unprecedented evance of institutional economics to the developscale. ment business.
The Case for Multilateralism
Economies of scale in information gathering, interpretation, and monitoring as well as in In this evolving global framework, the rationale for raising long-term funds in capital markets and in official multilateral intermediation arises from sharing portfolio risk also come into play. This imperfections in information markets, global combination of money and ideas is synergistic. development challenges, and the risk-bearing At early stages of a country's development or advantages related to the special contract enforcemarket transition, external support can be critical ment abilities within an international setting of in triggering private or concessional flows. multilateral organizations.
Similarly, by reducing the transaction costs of participants, multilateral institutions can help The cooperative characteristics of multilateral coordinate international funding both at the development agencies give them privileged access country and project levels. to development information. Furthermore, the high quality and international makeup of their profesThe end result is an improved allocation of sional staff give them credibility as a reliable source development information and global capital and of development advice. Disclosure of development the attenuation of market failures, especially from information and dissemination of analytical work the perspective of the poorest and least creditworhelp overcome the information asymmetries that thy member countries. Thus, the economic plague international capital markets and rationale for development assistance lies in its concessional aid flows.
public goods character, that is, its contribution to redressing market imperfections with respect to The high transaction costs involved in cross-border information and risk bearing and to the design of capital flows aimed at developing countries are cooperative solutions to the looming problems of caused not only by information asymmetries but the global commons. also by the difficulties of international contract enforcement. Since the obligations of multilateral Whether the advantages of institutional developinstitutions are backed by all their members, and ment through multilateral action sketched in this since they have built up a superior global monitorpaper will be recognized by the majorities of the ing capability, they have been entrusted with electorates of the industrial countries on which concessional resources targeted at poor countries development assistance ultimately depends is and delivery of financial intermediation services to itself a collective action dilemma. But this is developing countries on terms and conditions that another story. no private agency can replicate.
